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1 INTRODUCTION 
Brazil is facing a high level of violence that is particularly linked to urban spaces where 
statehood is not completed and state authorities do not provide protection from crime. 
Particularly in Rio de Janeiro, violence originating in favelas has spilled out to other parts 
of the city. As a result, the outside population increasingly supports a security-first 
approach in order to solve this problem (GAY, 2009, p. 37). The growing “securitization of 
the city” (MUGGAH; SAVAGE, 2012, p. 3) and the perception of these localities by the outside 
world is best illustrated by WILLIAMS (2010, p. 40): “In thinking about spaces and security (…), 
the danger flows out of its origin or locus in zones characterized by turbulence (…) to zones of 
order and stability”. As the country is going to host major sports events like the Football World 
Cup and Olympic Games in the coming years, federal and state governments are desperately 
seeking solutions for the security situation in order to be able to guarantee safety for citizens as 
well as visitors. For this, the deployment of Armed Forces in public security appears to be an 
efficient solution. Brazilian Armed Forces therefore engage in neighbourhoods that are “outside 
the de facto control of public security forces” (MUGGAH; SAVAGE 2012: 6) with the task of 
transforming them into spaces where the sovereignty of the state, especially the monopoly on 
violence, is valid. Nevertheless, this implies a trade-off between efficient governing in the short 
term and legitimate governing in the long run. The country faces the paradoxical situation that the 
democratic government delegates power to “authoritarian enclaves” (ZAVERUCHA, 2008, p. 130, 
own translation) who may prevent a further consolidation of the country´s democracy in order to 
conquer ´ exclaves´ of statehood. As a consequence, this also raises concerns about the civil-military 
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paradox, which means that an institution that is per se organized in an undemocratic way is used 
to protect democratic institutions (CROISSANT; KÜHN, 2011, p. 4).  
The constant struggle for civilian supremacy might be undermined by a regained 
significance of the military in domestic politics, as the influence of the Armed Forces on the 
transition and the new democratic constitution has obstructed fully democratized civil-military 
relations until today. This resilience of autocratic rule is a particular problem when the democratic 
government has to rely on the military for guaranteeing central functions of the state, e.g. the 
provision of security. In order to assess whether the use of military forces can be deemed a 
“democratic means of exercising authority” (ESTEVES, 2010, p. 619). I aim at taking a closer look 
on the development of civil-military relations from the transition to democracy until today.  
 
2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In order to achieve this, I will use the model of fully-fledged civilian control over the 
military developed by CROISSANT et al. (2011, p. 78). Drawing upon assumptions of historical 
institutionalism and strategic action, this approach works out five decision-making areas in civil-
military relations. Only if public administrations enjoy uncontested decision-making power in every 
field, complete civilian control is attained. Relying mainly on a qualitative evaluation of secondary 
sources, I will try to give an overview of the developments within these following dimensions since 
the end of military rule. 
 
Elite recruitment:  
Civilian control in this dimension means, that there ought to be an open political 
competition and that political leadership shall be exercised solely by civilian authorities. Civilian 
supremacy is restricted, if the Armed Forces retain the right of nomination for positions in the 
public administration, if the leadership of certain ministries is reserved for members of the Armed 
Forces, or if they either systematically or selectively try to influence the appointment of the head 
of state. 
 
Public policy: 
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This dimension refers to any policies that are not directly linked to defence or security, e.g. 
economic or social policies. The whole process of policy-making, from agenda-setting to policy 
implementation, shall be free from military influence. In this sense, annual budgeting is deemed 
especially important for civilian supremacy. For countries formerly ruled by military governments, 
it is further helpful to have a look at the state of transitional justice, since this area not only serves 
as a means to assess the rule of law, but also the power of civilian authorities to impose policies 
that might have negative consequences for the Armed Forces. The degree of civilian control in 
transitional justice does not only depend on the actual punishment of crimes committed during 
military rule. It is best measured by the way military elites try to influence or to resist the decisions 
of civilian institutions concerning transitional justice. 
 
Internal security: 
When Armed Forces are used for police action, civilian control especially depends on the 
degree of authority over the military during these assignments. The decisive measurement is 
whether the civilian institutions decide on frequency, duration, and range of these missions and 
whether they are able to control them effectively. 
 
External defence: 
Since external defence is the main task of Armed Forces, a certain degree of military 
autonomy does not pose a problem for civilian control. In this dimension, civilian supremacy can 
be assessed by the degree of civilian authorities´ ability to oversee the implementation of security 
policies. The crucial factor is decision-making power. Furthermore, civilian authorities shall be able 
to stop and punish a possible inappropriate behaviour by the Armed Forces. Ideally, the agenda-
setting in security policy should be carried out only by civilian institutions. 
 
Military organization: 
Military organization relates to decision-making on military equipment. This implies 
financial and technological resources, the regulations of the military doctrine and training, as well 
as the number of personnel. The extent of civilian control depends on the capability of limiting the 
necessary degree of military´s autonomy in these issues. 
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3 THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY 
3.1 ELITE RECRUITMENT 
In the early stages of democratization, elite recruitment used to be heavily influenced by 
the Armed Forces. During the controlled transition, not even a mass movement like the campaign 
for direct presidential elections (Diretas Já) was able to achieve its goals when facing strong military 
opposition. As a result, indirect presidential elections were held in 1985 with a Colegio Eleitoral that 
consisted of representatives of federal states and members of Congress. Therein, one third of the 
senators were appointed directly by the Armed Forces (SANTOS, 2004, p. 118). Hence, the 
political competition has not been open during the beginning of the Brazilian democratization 
process. After the death of designated president Tancredo Neves, José Sarney (both Partido do 
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB) took over as head of government. Since Sarney used to be 
chairman of Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), the party loyal to the military government, it 
was not surprising that the first president of the new democracy had little interest in extending 
civilian supremacy. Sarney did not see the Armed Forces as rivals, but rather as political power 
base. Shortly after the majority in congress refused allegiance to him, Sarney reacted by using the 
Armed Forces as a means of exerting pressure on congressmen (AGÜERO, 1997, p. 194). Another 
demonstration of this alliance has been the vehement opposition of the military against the 
shortening of Sarney´s presidential term (SOARES; LOYOLLA KUHLMANN, 2005, p. 502). Six 
out of 22 members of the first democratic cabinet have been active officers of the Armed Forces 
(HAGOPIAN, 1990, p. 156), the three military branches Army, Marine, and Air Force had their 
own ministries. Furthermore, presidential and governmental administrations consisted of a large 
number of military members (AGÜERO, 1997, p. 185). 
The first directly elected president after military rule, Fernando Collor de Mello (Partido de 
Reconstrução Nacional, PRN) halved the number of military positions in his cabinet. Yet, it was not 
only principles of civilian supremacy that led his actions, but also a certain rivalry with some 
members of the Armed Forces, that had tried to influence the election campaign by leaking 
rumours about Collor´s private life to the press (ZAVERUCHA; DA CUNHA REZENDE, 2009, 
p. 413). The military intelligence service and the corresponding ministry were dissolved and 
replaced by a civilian intelligence apparatus without ministerial representation (SANTOS, 2004, p. 
121). Nevertheless, Collor´s further attempts of cutting back the military´s influence were blocked 
by effective military lobbying. Their assessores parlamentares managed to win enough congressmen to 
their side and convinced them of refusing Collor´s proposal of creating a unified Ministry of 
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Defence (SAINT-PIERRE; WINAND, 2008, p. 53). Finally, Collor´s term ended with an 
impeachment due to suspicions of corruption. The Armed Forces kept a low profile during this 
process and refrained from influencing the members of parliament. Some observers were surprised 
by the passive stance of the military and its break with the habit of interfering in politics during 
times of crises (AGÜERO, 1997, p. 186) and see this as an adjustment to democratic norms 
(SANTOS, 2004, p. 124; SOARES; LOYOLLA KUHLMANN, 2005, p. 502; LINZ; STEPAN, 
1996, p. 179). Still, one needs to question the military´s motivation: Why should they have 
interfered in the impeachment of a presumably corrupt president that had tried to cut their 
prerogatives? A real test for the Armed Forces´ democratic convictions would have been an 
impeachment of a more attached president like Sarney. Furthermore, the designated successor 
Itamar Franco (PMDB) posed no threat to the Armed Forces´ prerogatives. After becoming 
president, Franco even raised the number of military cabinet members again to the number of nine 
(ZAVERUCHA; DA CUNHA REZENDE, 2009, p. 414). Henceforth, the Armed Forces actually 
stopped influencing the appointment of presidents and gave free rein to democratic mechanisms. 
An indicator of the growing democratic consolidation in this respect was the presidency of a former 
opponent of the military regime, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). Having 
been imprisoned during authoritarian rule, he finally became president without major military 
opposition. Yet, Lula´s rather defensive attitude which prevented conflicts helped the Armed 
Forces to accept a former adversary as commander-in-chief (SOARES; LOYOLLA 
KUHLMANN, 2005, p. 503).  
 Thus, the most visible representation of the former authoritarian rulers in politics has been 
the military-led ministries. Before dissolving the military branches´ ministries, Brazil used to be the 
last South American country without unified Ministry of Defence. Only in 1999, during the second 
term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), the unification 
of the three military ministries was realized. Yet, the personnel of the officially civilian-led Ministry 
of Defence consist mainly of military members. Except for the minister and his chefe de gabinete, only 
few high-ranking members of the ministry are civilians (LÓPEZ, 2008, p. 310). In addition, the 
appointment of the minister of defence depends on the informal approval by the Armed Forces 
(SAINT-PIERRE; WINAND, 2008, p. 57). With currently one military member of government 
(the head of the presidents´ Gabinete de Segurança Institucional), the numerical representation of the 
Armed Forces in the political elite has been reduced significantly. Nevertheless, informal contacts 
to ministries that are engaged with policies that affect the military´s interests help the Armed Forces 
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to bring their agenda into policy-making (SANTOS, 2004, p. 138). To summarize, the civilian 
supremacy in this dimension has been formally achieved, yet is curtailed by the military´s informal 
exertion of influence. 
 
3.2 PUBLIC POLICY 
The Armed Forces´ self-perception and their habit to engage in economic and political 
affairs are based on the key role they played during the country´s historical development 
(HUNTER, 1998, p. 311; SAINT-PIERRE; WINAND, 2008, p. 59). Thus, the Armed Forces 
significantly limited the civilian government’s political leverage right after the end of military rule, 
especially in reforms concerning economic and social policies. Striking examples are the agrarian 
reform, the creation of a common market with Argentina, and the right to strike. After the 
announcement of an agrarian reform by José Sarney, the military-led intelligence service took care 
of a massive personnel restructuring of the entrusted administrations because of an alleged leftist 
infiltration. The common market with Argentina was originally supposed to comprise a broad 
technological co-operation, even in the strategically relevant sector of nuclear technology. As the 
Armed Forces then were still pursuing the plan of building an atomic bomb and were seeing a 
possible collaboration with the former arch enemy as a threat to the strategic position of the 
country, they denied their consent (AGÜERO, 1997, p. 186). The most visible interference during 
the early stages of democratization took place in questions of workers´ rights. Following the 
announcement of a general strike, the Armed Forces occupied steel mills and train stations 
(STEPAN, 1988, p. 108ff.) without any approval by civilian authorities (AGÜERO, 1997, p. 185). 
This substantial resistance is considered to be the major reason for the delay in passing the bill on 
the redesign of the right to strike (HAGOPIAN, 1990, p. 156). 
During military rule, the Armed Forces had constantly expanded their share in Brazil´s 
economy, particularly in technological and scientific areas. Hence, a large part of these sectors was 
still owned by the Armed Forces during and after the transition. When its regime came to an ending, 
the military was responsible for approximately one quarter of the expenses in these economic 
branches (CONCA, 1992, p. 146). Among other things, the Armed Forces had decisive influence 
on the economic success of aircraft manufacturer EMBRAER. As there has neither been a public 
debate on this issue nor any pressure by civil society or political elites (MANI, 2011, p. 40), the 
Armed Forces have largely managed to maintain their crucial role in the country´s economy. Even 
though formal participation in economic policies may have diminished, strategically important 
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branches like the armaments industry and especially the high-tech sector remain to be heavily 
influenced by the Armed Forces (ALBRECHT, 2011, p. 22). Other areas of the federal economy 
also continue to be controlled by the Armed Forces, e.g. the ports that are led by the Navy, or the 
supervision of airports that is exercised by the Air Force (CONCA, 1992, p. 151). Due to the power 
of military personnel to obstruct reforms, even the planned demilitarization of the aviation sector 
has been blocked (SAINT-PIERRE; WINAND, 2008, p. 75). 
During the military regime, the defence expenditures´ share in the federal budget shrank 
constantly. From 1972 until 1983 and measured against Brazil´s gross domestic product, the 
amount fell from 1.4 percent to 0.7 percent (STEPAN, 1988, p. 72). Yet, due to the average 
economic growth of 5.22% in this time, this decline did not mean a significant reduction of actual 
figures (ZAVERUCHA; DA CUNHA REZENDE, 2009, p. 411). Today, Brazil disposes of the 
largest military budget in South America, yet only a minor share of this budget actually flows into 
defence investments. Still, it is planned to spend 2.5 percent of the annual GDP on military 
equipment (FLEMES, 2008, p. 4). In terms of civil-military relations, the share of defence spending 
is not as important as the procedure of planning the federal budget. A major obstacle for civilian 
supremacy is the lack of an actual budgetary sovereignty of the parliament. The implementation of 
the budget that is passed in Congress is not binding for the government, but merely optional. The 
members of parliament are not involved in the process of designing the military budget. They only 
vote on the draft prepared by the president, the Ministry of Defence and the commanders of the 
military branches. Furthermore, the Congress is deprived of essential information regarding the 
expenditures within the military budget.  Hence, the Armed Forces are able to exert significant 
informal influence on budget-making, as – unlike the budget of other sectors – the military budget 
is usually shielded from veto by the legislative branch (FLEMES, 2004, p. 17). After the return to 
democracy, the military-led ministries regularly accounted for more than ten percent of overall 
expenditures for all ministries (ZAVERUCHA, 2005, p. 96). At the same time, the Armed Forces 
know how to take advantage of the congressmen´s lack of interest in military affairs. The members 
of parliament cannot expect an electoral payoff by specialized knowledge of these issues and 
therefore do not use their potential influence on policy- and budget-making (HARIG; ZILLA, 
2010, p. 3). The actual extent of military´s influence on the parliamentary process is hard to 
measure, since its informal character limits the possibilities of scientific inquiries (PION-BERLIN, 
2010, p. 528). Although it is certain that the Armed Forces possess considerable privileges in the 
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competition of ministries for financial resources (ZAVERUCHA; DA CUNHA REZENDE, 
2009, p. 414).  
Considering the situation of transitional justice, the amnesty law of 1979 – originally 
designed to protect members of guerrilla organizations from prosecution – is still hampering the 
clarification of crimes committed by the military regime. As a condition for their consent to the 
return to democracy, the Armed Forces were able to extend the scope of this law on themselves 
(HEINZ, 1999, p. 468; SANTOS, 2004, p. 119). With the first president José Sarney as a strong 
advocate of military´s interests, little was done in the early stages of the New Republic to clarify 
crimes of the military rulers. The following years saw an avoidance of conflict in the sensitive issue 
of coping with the past. The strong military lobby in Congress intervened especially often in this 
domain and managed to protect its own interests (FLEMES, 2004, p. 19).  Even a former opponent 
of the military regime like Lula was not willing and able to win out over a broad coalition of high-
ranking members of the Armed Forces and congressmen. Especially in the beginning of his first 
term, Lula did not seek any confrontation with the Armed Forces, although the constituency of his 
party showed interest in clarifying the past. After a scandal concerning the Armed Forces defending 
the torture of “subversives” during the military regime, civil society organizations demanded the 
opening of secret files and the clarification of disappeared people´s fate (SANTOS, 2004, p. 137). 
Yet, this initially did not change the restraint of Lula and the PT (SOARES, 2004, p. 96). Only 
towards the end of his second presidential term, Lula tried to create a truth commission by decree 
and to abolish the amnesty law. Due to the threat of resignation by the commanders of the three 
military branches as well as by the Minister of Defence, Nelson Jobim (PMDB), this project failed. 
In his role as commander-in-chief, Lula would have been allowed to fill these positions 
immediately, but nevertheless shied away from further confrontation. No debate in Congress took 
place, but the conservative majority probably would have refused to follow Lula (HART, 2010, 35).  
A subsequently developed, more moderate proposal by Lulas successor Dilma Rousseff 
(PT) has been accepted by both chambers of Congress in autumn 2011. Rousseff, who used to be 
a militant opponent of the military regime and allegedly suffered torture in prison, let the heads of 
the Armed Forces approve the bill before handing it over to Congress (MAGALHÃES; FALCÃO, 
2011). Consequently, the amnesty law remains to be valid and the truth commission does not have 
the authority for criminal prosecution. Several members of parliament expressed their resentment 
about this way of clarifying the past (BRESCIANI, 2011; FALCÃO, 2011). Yet, there was no real 
debate in Congress concerning this bill. De facto, the parliamentary decision-making process was 
bypassed. Transitional justice seems to have become a matter of negotiation between the executive 
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branch and the Armed Forces, therefore eliminating civilian possibilities of influence. Overall, there 
is little political will and/or ability to take on a strong stance against the Armed Forces in this issue. 
 
3.3 INTERNAL SECURITY           
The beginning of a significant military deployment in public security issues after the 
transition dates back to 1992, when the Armed Forces patrolled the streets of Rio de Janeiro during 
the United Nations Earth Summit (HUNTER, 1998, p. 311). With major events like the Football 
World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016 approaching, Rio de Janeiro remains to be a focal 
point of military action in internal security. Favelas that are de facto controlled by non-state violent 
actors (PION-BERLIN; TRINKUNAS, 2011, p. 43) are increasingly seized with the help of 
troops. Nevertheless, following CROISSANT et al., the decisive factor for civilian control in this 
respect is not the kind of military deployment but the civilian influence on scope, duration and 
frequency of these actions. 
Due to its constitutional role, the Armed Forces are endowed with significant autonomy in 
matters of internal security. Article 142 assigns the Armed Forces the guarantee of constitutional 
powers and under circumstances of law and order, which supports the military´s self-perception of 
being the real guardian of the country (FLEMES, 2008, p. 4). Since terms like order can be 
interpreted in manifold ways, the military´s leeway in domestic security is high (SOARES; 
LOYOLLA KUHLMANN, 2005, p. 479). In this sense, the Armed Forces see themselves as 
guarantor of the constitutional bodies, not in reverse. This follows the logic of the Doctrine of 
National Security inherited from the times of Cold War, where the military was supposed to be 
crucial in the country´s defence against “subversive” powers. After Cold War, the focus of this 
doctrine switched from external enemies to internal security (DE OLIVEIRA; SOARES, 2000, p. 
103). This means that today´s enemy is not political any more. The enemies to be fought are 
criminals, which often operate in poor regions of Brazil (PEARCE, 2010, p. 296). Yet, military 
training does not prepare for police actions (ZAVERUCHA, 2008, p. 128).  
Since Brazilian police forces are not able to cope with criminality, the federal and state 
governments increasingly rely on military effectiveness in fighting crime. With a presidential decree 
issued in August 2001, Fernando Henrique Cardoso authorized the Armed Forces to take action 
in “Operations for Guaranteeing Law and Order”, which originally was the Polícia Militar´s sphere 
of responsibility (ZAVERUCHA, 2008, p. 139). This regulation allows for an intervention of 
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federal military forces in the Brazilian states when the president decreed this action after the public 
security agencies of the concerned state proved to be not capable of solving the problem. Even 
then, the Armed Forces´ action shall be limited until the exceptional issue that caused the military 
deployment has been resolved (GARCIA, 2008, p. 16). However, the reality does not match this 
regulation. One example is the military seizure of Rio de Janeiro´s favela Complexo do Alemão 
beginning in November 2010. The newly elected president Dilma Rousseff soon had to deny 
rumours that she and the governor of Rio de Janeiro had informally agreed upon a military 
deployment until after the World Cup 2014 (HARIG; ZILLA, 2010, p. 2). The point of time when 
especially trained police forces were finally supposed to take over was delayed from October 2011 
to June 2012 (EL ESPECTADOR, 2011).      
The civilian authorities use to interpret this regulation for the benefit of prolonged military 
actions of their own accord and therefore obtain a certain degree of influence on scope, duration 
and frequency. Nevertheless, an effective civilian control of the military operations usually does 
not exist. An example from 2006 illustrates this lack of oversight: Several armed men attacked an 
army unit in Rio de Janeiro and stole a number of firearms. The Armed Forces reacted quite 
disproportionately by occupying seven favelas with 1600 troops and heavy military equipment. This 
operation was justified by military law, after which robbing arms is considered a military crime and 
therefore might entail a military operation. The Armed Forces extended their deployment in an 
arbitrary way by imposing curfews without legal authorization. Inhabitants of the affected favelas 
complained about human rights violations committed by military units. Among other accusations, 
the public prosecutor´s office started to investigate the death of a 16-year-old youth, just to stop 
any inquiries by order of the government. Afterwards, the defence minister José Alencar (Partido 
Republicano Brasileiro, PRB) denied any excessive behaviour of the Armed Forces (ZAVERUCHA, 
2008, p. 141). To sum this up, an effective control of this deployment did not take place. Quite the 
contrary, the civilian authorities intentionally waived their right to sanction the military´s 
misbehaviour.  
 
3.4 EXTERNAL DEFENCE     
As Latin America in general faces little danger of interstate wars, the public interest in 
security policy is not very high (FLEMES, 2004, p. 7). Brazil is a prominent example of this 
situation, since there has been no significant threat to its borders for more than 140 years and the 
largest South American state is in no menacing confrontation with any country of the world 
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(ZILLA, 2011, p. 7). Against this background, it is hard for Brazilian members of parliament to 
gain profit from detailed knowledge of security and defence issues. The Armed Forces therefore 
enjoy a considerable information advantage compared to a central civilian supervision authority. 
Additionally, public support for parliamentary initiatives concerning external defence can be 
expected to be low: No other Latin American country shows such high levels of positive attitudes 
towards military interventions in politics (LATINOBARÓMETRO, 2009, p. 15; 
LATINOBARÓMETRO, 2010, p. 73) accompanied by significant scepticism towards the 
parliament. Only 45 percent of Brazilians think that there can be no democracy without a congress 
(LATINOBARÓMETRO, 2011, p. 42). This illustrates why the Brazilian presidents usually 
managed to retain the decisions on external defence for themselves or rather negotiated them 
directly with the Armed Forces than taking the Congress into account. However, the “alijamento” 
(DE OLIVEIRA; SOARES, 2000, p. 122) of parliamentary supervision does not provoke any 
negative public opinion, which in return does not pressure congressmen to change this situation. 
As a result, Congress is left out from the decision-making process in external defence, which is a 
major setback for gaining civilian supremacy.      
Due to the fragmented institutional architecture of three military ministries, agenda-setting 
in matters of security policy has been divided until the middle of the 1990s. Diverging interests of 
the respective ministries did not allow the Armed Forces to develop a coherent strategic approach 
towards external defence. Moreover, this hampered the influence of the executive branch, as there 
was no point of single contact in the Armed Forces that would have helped to facilitate 
negotiations. Even before the creation of a single Ministry of Defence, the Cardoso government 
managed to create the Política de Defesa Nacional (PDN) in 1996. With this document, standard 
guidelines for the future Armed Forces´ strategy were issued for the first time (SANTOS, 2004, p. 
130). It especially referred to the so-called new threats like transnational terrorism and drug trade 
(BERTAZZO, 2007, p. 34) and established the co-operation with neighbouring states in matters 
of security policy. Yet, resistance of the single military branches towards the PDN´s aims blocked 
its implementation (FLEMES, 2008, p. 2). Only with the unified ministry, the military branches 
started to accept common strategic goals. 
In default of a White Book on external defence, the Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) 
from 2008 represents the most recent document on strategic orientation for the Brazilian Armed 
Forces. It was jointly developed by the Ministry of Defence and the commanders of the military 
branches. A clear division of responsibilities between civilian institutions and the Armed Forces 
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was established: civilians shall define the hypothetical conflicts, while the military´s task is to assess 
the probability of these scenarios. Besides the already mentioned new threats, the END sees the 
insufficient military presence in regions of strategic importance (the Amazon basin, or the Brazilian 
sea area, called Amazônia Azul) as main dangers. Hence, the protection of natural resources 
constitutes the major contemporary task of external defence. This bears special importance for the 
Navy that so far has not been significantly involved in issues concerning foreign or security policy 
(BERTAZZO, 2007, p. 37). While Armed Forces and civilian institutions seem to agree upon 
possible conflict scenarios, the assessment of their probability is rather disputed. As an example, 
the Navy sees a threat in the exploitation of Brazil´s oil reserves by foreign powers, even though 
the states that would be technically able to do this have already been given contractual shares and 
therefore do not pose a risk (ALBRECHT, 2011, p. 6). The same applies to a possible US-
intervention in the Amazon region. Even though the probability of such a foreign involvement 
falls almost to zero, the Armed Forces are preparing special defence tactics, which are partially 
based on guerrilla warfare (PIGNOTTI, 2008, p. 88). As will be shown in the chapter on military 
organization, the Armed Forces and particularly the Navy seem to be able to take advantage of 
these diverging interpretations for pushing through their requests for military equipment. 
Overall, one discovers a shared agenda-setting capability in the dimension of external defence, 
which does not include a significant parliamentary involvement. This is actually a progress 
compared to the situation a few years ago. The development of a foreign policy strategy with 
military components finally forced the civilian government members to gain a minimum of 
knowledge in this policy field. Far into the 2000s, the structural information asymmetry between 
Armed Forces and government has been so huge, that the Armed Forces were able to partially 
exercise political steering in matters of external defence (FLEMES, 2004, p. 22). While the 
parliamentary knowledge of external defence remains low, the executive branch seems to have 
developed certain awareness. This was largely influenced by the increasing participation of Brazilian 
troops in UN-peacekeeping missions, most prominently MINUSTAH. The deployment in Haiti is 
not only an expression of Brazil´s rising responsibility as an emerging power, it also serves as a 
training ground for future military actions in fighting crime inside the country, as has been admitted 
by former Minister of Defence José Viegas (ZAVERUCHA, 2008, p. 140). This might actually be 
a setback for gaining civilian supremacy, since a prominent military role in fighting crime could 
further deepen the Armed Forces´ significance in domestic affairs. 
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3.5 MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
This dimension is closely intertwined with external defence, especially in issues concerning 
the Navy. As laid down in the END, the Brazilian Navy´s future main operational area is to be 
found in the Southern Atlantic Ocean (FLEMES, 2008, p. 6). Right after the END´s publication, 
the Navy issued a procurement plan that budgets for a doubling in the number of battleships until 
2030 (ALBRECHT, 2011, p. 5). While there certainly is a certain degree of civilian control in the 
planning of these acquisitions, the Armed Forces still prevail in the interpretation of strategies and 
the consequential equipment. 
It seems to be a general pattern that the Armed Forces present the civilian institutions with 
a fait accompli. Already the PDN has been used by the Brazilian Army to justify the purchase of a 
large number of tanks, even though this heavy armament was not suitable for fighting the threats 
that were mentioned in the PDN, like drug trade and terrorism. The Navy decided in 1997 to buy 
several combat aircrafts from Kuwait without prior permission. Afterwards, president Cardoso 
approved this purchase without consulting the cabinet or the parliamentary defence committee. 
Furthermore, the Navy used these planes in lobbying for the acquisition of a prestigious yet 
unnecessary air craft carrier (FLEMES, 2004, p. 18). The END foresaw the purchase of several 
submarines. The Navy though is again creating facts before the civilian institutions can make their 
final approval: A French-Brazilian contract provides for the construction of several conventional 
submarines and a new submarine base. Even though Congress had not approved of this deal yet, 
the Navy was already pre-financing the construction (ALBRECHT, 2011, p. 9). An also scheduled   
construction of a nuclear-powered submarine is without much practical military value but very 
prestigious. Seen merely militarily, there is doubt that nuclear submarines are suitable for 
deployments defined by the END. For the same amount of money, the Brazilian Navy would be 
able to buy a larger number of conventionally driven submarines that would serve for the same 
operational objectives. Hence, the approval of the nuclear submarine´s purchase depends to a large 
extent on successful lobbying, e.g. by the Navy´s supreme commander. Despite the doubts about 
its usefulness, high-ranking members of the Armed Forces seem to consider the acquisition right 
(ALBRECHT, 2011, p. 13; p. 22-24).  
It seems reasonable to suppose that this course of action has its roots in the END´s 
objective of resorting to the mastery of nuclear technology in order to guarantee for the national 
independence and to safeguard foreign policy interests (RÜHLE, 2010, p. 2). The Armed Forces 
would be a profiteer of the use of nuclear energy, since it controls the necessary technology. Many 
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important facilities, e.g. a uranium conversion plant, are situated in military sites (ALBRECHT, 
2011, p. 22). It is thanks to many years of Armed Forces´ lobbying that Lula resumed the project 
on a nuclear submarine, which had already been halted by Cardoso in 1996. Before Lula´s decision, 
the Navy has been unpleased with the strictly civilian usage of nuclear energy and finally managed 
to bring back the military option by constant lobbying. Despite the constitutional prohibition on 
using nuclear technology for military means, Lula´s minister of defence José Alencar even 
advocated nuclear arming (RÜHLE, 2010, p. 6ff.). In sum, there are certain shared interests of 
civilian governments and the Armed Forces in matters of nuclear energy. 
While the civilian institutions seem to be heavily influenced by the Armed Forces´ 
professional lobbying, civilian supremacy in the dimension of military organization is further 
hampered by the constitution. The Congress´ task is to define the personnel strength of the Armed 
Forces, to give its assent before the President declares war and to announce the state of emergency 
(CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, 1988, TÍTULO IV, 
CAPITULO I, SEÇÃO II). Both chambers of Congress have established committees that are not 
exclusively responsible for matters of defence but also have to cope with other issues concerning 
foreign policy. Due to the already mentioned lack of knowledge in military affairs, the committee´s 
work is not effective. Especially the senate´s committee is considered to be a “complete failure” 
(FLEMES, 2004, p. 21, own translation), which rarely employs its already weak control 
instruments. Moreover, there are no parliamentary powers in central issues like the oversight on 
military intelligence, the promotion of officers or the Armed Forces´ educational system 
(SOARES, 2004, p. 95). Military education is still determined by the Armed Forces themselves, the 
Ministry of Defence is only in charge of the curriculum at the Escola Superior de Guerra, the highest 
military academy (SAINT-PIERRE; WINAND, 2008, p. 59). Since the ministry´s apparatus is 
mainly staffed by members of the Armed Forces, no effective civilian control is achieved in this 
respect.  
 
4 CONCLUSION 
Some dimensions have seen a considerable increase in civilian supremacy, while others have 
seen a transformation from formal to rather informal ways of military influence. CROISSANT et 
al.´s central dimension, elite recruitment, probably represents the most positive development for 
civilian supremacy. Here, the Armed Forces have accepted democratic rules, especially in relation 
to the presidency. It is a sign for civilian supremacy that the military even accepts former opponents 
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as president and commander-in-chief. Yet, the Armed Forces still obtain considerable informal 
influence on the appointment of the minister of defence. Furthermore, the ministry´s staffs consist 
mainly of members of the Armed Forces. Hence, the minister tends to be more loyal to the military 
than to the civilian institutions in times of crises.  
The Armed Forces have withdrawn from their open influence on the dimension of Public 
Policy but maintain their clout on areas of high interest. Large parts of strategically relevant 
economic branches are still under military control. Combined with informal influence on Congress 
and weak parliamentary oversight, the Armed Forces possess significant budgetary powers. 
Transitional justice is hampered by the military´s power to block civilian decision-making in this 
regard. At the same time, civilian agencies do not dare to withstand the military resistance. As the 
government increasingly relies on the Armed Forces in matters of internal security, the military´s 
bargaining power is going to remain high. 
The dimension of internal security, particularly important for the current military 
deployments in public security, shows a great weakness of the democratic state. Here, the military´s 
significance has been rising since transition. With civilian institutions that exercise their right to 
control the Armed Forces, this would only be a minor problem. Since the government depends on 
the deployment of troops for fighting crime, it defends the Armed Forces against criticism relating 
to human rights´ violations and neglects its duty to oversee the military actions. Initially, this 
problem derives from the weakness of civilian security institutions. If police forces were able to 
protect citizens from crime and violence, there would be no need of sending troops. With civilian 
institutions relying on the effectiveness of military units for guaranteeing security before and during 
major events like the Olympic Games, a long-term problem for the legitimacy of democratic rule 
might arise. The civilian state transfers basic principles of modern statehood, the provision of 
security as well as rule of law (SCHNECKENER, 2007, p. 105), into the Armed Forces´ 
responsibility. To word it as a deliberative provocation, one might ask whether there is a need of 
civilian institutions, if essential functions of the state are carried out by the military.  
In matters of external defence, at least the executive branch has developed a certain degree 
of civilian expertise, which allows for political steering of foreign security policy. The Armed Forces 
significantly influence the agenda-setting processes but there are no major conflicts with civilian 
governments, as the status of Brazil as an emerging power has brought a rise in military´s 
significance for foreign policy. The Armed Forces well understood to seize this opportunity for 
modernizing their equipment. 
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The dimension of military organization shows co-operation between Armed Forces and 
civilian agencies. Still, the military manages to take advantage of the executive branch´s 
benevolence. A problematical aspect is the lack of parliamentary oversight. The influence of the 
legislative branch is absent because members of Congress do not use their competences and let 
themselves be bypassed by the government.  
Overall, significant steps towards civilian supremacy have been made, even though the 
Armed Forces retain a high degree of informal influence on civil-military relations. The lack of 
institutionalized civilian control mainly derives from the weak role of the parliament. This allows 
for members of governments and presidents to jointly decide issues of relevance for the civil-
military relationship by circumventing the legislative branch. As a consequence of this personalized 
control mechanisms, institutionalized civilian control is hard to achieve. Would the Congress take 
on a stronger stance in this issue, this problem could be resolved. Yet, if members of parliament 
neglect their duties, civilian supremacy will continue to be a matter of president´s personal 
authority. This could well pose problems to the Brazilian democracy. As the Armed Forces´ self-
perception of being the true guardian of the country´s fate will likely not change, the lack of 
institutionalized civilian supremacy might pave the way for a military comeback in politics in times 
of serious crisis. Hence, the question whether the deployment of Armed Forces may be a 
democratic means of exercising authority is put at the mercy of the military itself.   
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As Forças Armadas como Agência de Segurança e as Relações Entre Civis e Militares no 
Brasil 
 
Resumo 
 
Na fase de preparação para grandes eventos esportivos, o Brasil depende cada vez mais do apoio 
das Forças Armadas na prestação de segurança pública. Tendo em conta o passado autoritário do 
país, isto levanta preocupações sobre o estado atual da supremacia civil sobre os militares. 
Aplicando um modelo que divide a relação civil-militar nas cinco dimensões de recrutamento da 
elite, políticas públicas, segurança interna, defesa externa, bem como organização militar, este artigo 
tem como objetivo avaliar o desenvolvimento da supremacia civil da transição para a democracia 
até hoje. O artigo descobre que as prerrogativas militares foram consideravelmente reduzidas, 
embora a supremacia civil ainda carece de uma institucionalização adequada. No longo prazo, as 
formas informais de manter as Forças Armadas fora da política podem não ser suficientemente 
eficiente. 
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The Armed Forces as Security Agency and the Civil-military Relationship in Brazil  
 
Abstract 
 
In the run-up to major sports events, Brazil increasingly relies on the support of Armed Forces in 
the provision of public security. Given the country´s authoritarian past, this raises concerns about 
the current state of civilian supremacy over the military. Applying a model that subdivides the civil-
military relationship into the five dimensions of elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, 
external defence as well as military organization, this article aims at assessing the development of 
civilian supremacy from the transition to democracy until today. It finds out that military 
prerogatives have been considerably reduced, even though the civilian supremacy still lacks a 
proper institutionalization. In the long run, informal ways of keeping the Armed Forces out of 
politics might not be efficient enough. 
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